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Abstract
The emergence of nuclear terrorism, a threat that President Obama called "the gravest danger we
face," has signaled a paradigm shift in international security. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
sensitive nuclear technologies and materials have become increasingly available. Globalization and
the inadequate enforcement of treaties and export controls have allowed the proliferation of nuclear
weapons materials. Today, international terrorist organizations seek to employ weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) as a means to influence national policies around the world. AlQaida spokesman
Suleiman Abu Gheith declared that in order to balance the injustices that have been inflicted on the
Muslim population worldwide, al-Qaida's new objective is "to kill 4 million Americans–2 million of
them children." As political scientist Graham Allison notes, this could be achieved with either 1,334
attacks similar in magnitude to those of 9/11, or one nuclear bomb.Building a nuclear program is an
arduous task that requires tacit knowledge, the recruitment of nuclear scientists, engineers, and
machinists, and the resources and time to obtain nuclear materials and components. While it is
unlikely that terrorist organizations have the capacity to develop full-fledged programs in the near
term, terrorist development and acquisition of nuclear weapons remains a long-term threat that
requires international action.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss1/319
Global Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
By Emily Diez, Terrance Clark, and Caroline Zaw-Mon
Introduction
The emergence of nuclear terrorism, a threat that President Obama called 
"the gravest danger we face," has signaled a paradigm shift in interna-
tional security.1 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, sensitive nuclear 
technologies and materials have become increasingly available. Globaliza-
tion and the inadequate enforcement of treaties and export controls have 
allowed the proliferation of nuclear weapons materials.2 Today, interna-
tional terrorist organizations seek to employ weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) as a means to influence national policies around the world. Al-
Qaida spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith declared that in order to balance 
the injustices that have been inflicted on the Muslim population world-
wide, al-Qaida's new objective is "to kill 4 million Americans–2 million of 
them children."3 As political scientist Graham Allison notes, this could be 
achieved with either 1,334 attacks similar in magnitude to those of 9/11, 
or one nuclear bomb.4
Building a nuclear program is an arduous task that requires tacit knowl-
edge, the recruitment of nuclear scientists, engineers, and machinists, 
and the resources and time to obtain nuclear materials and components.5 
While it is unlikely that terrorist organizations have the capacity to 
develop full-fledged programs in the near term, terrorist development 
and acquisition of nuclear weapons remains a long-term threat that 
requires international action.6
State-Based Nuclear Programs: The Supply Chain
Unstable countries with successful or burgeoning nuclear weapons pro-
grams that support or refuse to control terrorism have engendered an 
ominous security threat to the world community. Pakistan and North 
Korea's refusal to participate in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) has not only disrupted regional security in East and Central Asia, 
but has also contributed to second-tier proliferation, or the illicit nuclear 
trade between developing nations with limited indigenous nuclear 
resources and technologies.7 Nuclear proliferation experts believe that 
second-tier networks are pervasive, interconnected, highly effective, and 
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possibly linked to terrorist organizations.8 These networks have profited 
from unsecured Russian stockpiles and contributed to the development of 
illicit weapons programs in non-nuclear states.9
Ultimately, terrorist organizations lack the capacity to develop nuclear 
arms independently and must seek assistance from states, private indus-
tries, and individuals. In order to minimize nuclear proliferation to ter-
rorist groups, states should continue to strengthen export controls 
worldwide, improve incentives for governments to enter into and fulfill 
their obligations under the non-proliferation regime, and more carefully 
monitor noncompliant states and individuals. This report considers the 
roles that Russia, Pakistan, and North Korea play in nuclear proliferation 
and identifies measures that should be taken to reduce the spread of 
nuclear weapons and prevent nuclear terrorism.
Case Study: Russia
The collapse of a major nuclear state followed by instability and infighting 
in the early 1990s resulted in a significant nuclear proliferation problem. 
Russian leaders faced the challenge not only of securing nuclear material 
but also of creating a new system of export controls in a newly minted 
capitalist society. Although Russia has made significant strides in nuclear 
non-proliferation with its heavy involvement in international agreements 
and in establishing strong export controls, these measures have proven to 
be inadequate.
At the end of the Cold War, Moscow controlled only eighty percent of its 
strategic nuclear weaponry, with remaining materials and supplies 
located in the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.10 Today, the Russian 
Ministry of Defense maintains and consolidates these warheads located in 
a small number of storage sites and facilities. Russia owns the world's 
largest stockpile of weapons-usable fissile materials, including at least 
950 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and approximately 
145 tons of weapons-grade plutonium (plus or minus 30 percent).11 Of 
this amount, Moscow has 350 tons of HEU and 55 tons loaded on nuclear 
warheads.12 Although the government has decreased its number of 
nuclear warheads since the mid-1980s, Russia's nuclear supply still 
remains a major security problem.13
Moscow revised export legislation in 1999 and established the Export 
Control Commission of the Russian Federation to coordinate export con-
trol lists for weapons materials and dual-use technologies. The Russian 
Government recently enacted a number of controls aimed specifically at 
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limiting nuclear proliferation. The passage of these measures demon-
strates progress, but Russia continues to support missile programs and 
civilian nuclear projects in high-risk nations for nuclear proliferation and 
terrorist activities.14 Without effective nuclear material safeguards in the 
Former Soviet Union (FSU), second-tier proliferation will increase.
Although Russia has a strong strategic interest in supporting nuclear non-
proliferation, Moscow has not prioritized or provided sufficient resources 
for effective export controls to stop the unauthorized export of nuclear 
and sensitive dual-use technology and equipment. Not only does Russia 
lack political will, but corruption and a scarcity of resources have also hin-
dered non-proliferation efforts.15 Furthermore, as Russia has attempted 
to expand its economy, the country has developed a business culture that 
is averse to regulations, and firms have been slow to implement effective 
compliance systems.16 Accountability and control are Russia's greatest 
challenges, and safeguarding a large quantity of nuclear materials 
remains a daunting task since Moscow lacks a comprehensive strategy for 
accountability and security.
Case Study: Pakistan
As a nation racked with security problems, characterized by corruption 
and instability, and firm in its defiance of the NPT, Pakistan is a particu-
larly high-risk nation for nuclear proliferation. Pakistan is also a front line 
for the War on Terror with a high prevalence of terrorist organizations 
operating within its borders. Terrorism experts have long suspected that 
individuals within the government and the military associate with al-
Qaida. Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan's 2004 confes-
sion of his involvement in black market nuclear trade unearthed serious 
problems at high levels of government.
Pakistan is estimated to have 55–90 nuclear weapons and increasing 
stockpiles of HEU and plutonium.17 Many of its nuclear weapons are 
stored disassembled, which increases the risk of theft, smuggling, and 
illegal export.18 Although Pakistan is not considered to be a major export 
nation of WMD-related goods, the country's history of evading interna-
tional non-proliferation agreements, lax nuclear export controls, and the 
A.Q. Khan scandal demonstrate Islamabad's high risk.19 During the last 
several decades of nuclear development, Pakistan acquired vital informa-
tion and materials including uranium enrichment from Europe and mis-
sile technology and weapons blueprints from China.20 Those involved in 
the nuclear program used front companies and intermediaries, falsified 
documents, and purchased critical components for nuclear technolo-
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gies.21 These capabilities combined with weak export controls and other 
vulnerabilities make Pakistan one of the most difficult cases for nuclear 
proliferation. Pakistan is party to such international agreements as the 
Nuclear Safety Convention and the Convention on Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material. Islamabad's export controls are decidedly weak despite 
the nation's attempts to reorganize and restructure both its nuclear pro-
grams and export controls.22 Pakistan participates in other WMD conven-
tions but continues to defy the international community by refusing to 
participate in the NPT.23
Pakistan's proliferation history, nuclear capabilities and stockpiles, 
inability to maintain control over its territory, and the prevalence of ter-
rorist activity within its borders are causes for concern. The U.S. and the 
international community should work closely with Pakistan to improve 
security within Southeast Asia and pave the way to Islamabad's accep-
tance into the "nuclear club." This would increase regulations on Paki-
stani nuclear and dual-use materials, possibly decrease the availability of 
sensitive material and technologies on the black market, and potentially 
reduce illicit activities and terrorist access to nuclear weapons.
Case Study: North Korea
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, commonly known as 
North Korea) remains one of the most challenging nuclear proliferations 
cases. Although the United States and other developed countries have 
banned trade with North Korea, Pyongyang continues to export missiles 
and other potentially dangerous technologies. North Korea withdrew 
from the NPT and is currently party to few (if any) international and 
regional non-proliferation efforts.
Nuclear weapons experts believe that North Korea has developed one or 
two nuclear weapons, and that Pyongyang has the capability to produce 
6–8 more by reprocessing spent fuel stockpiles.24 Pyongyang claims to 
have acquired significant plutonium stockpiles, but there is debate about 
the amount and the potential threat posed by this supply.25 The DPRK 
has also been a major exporter of ballistic missiles since the 1980s. The 
regime has prioritized this program because it has brought considerable 
revenue to the isolated country.26 There is great uncertainty surrounding 
the North Korean nuclear program, but the instability of the nation and 
Pyongyang's nuclear developments and missile tests are troubling.
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North Korea will likely continue to develop and produce ballistic missiles 
with superior range and sophistication in order to maintain trade and 
improve economic stability.27 The problem of spent fuel is also worrying 
for the international community. Excess spent fuel could be sold on the 
black market to second-tier countries or even directly to terrorist organi-
zations.28 To date, there is no evidence that North Korea has sold or 
transferred plutonium to other countries, but the possibility remains a 
concern.29 Six Party Talks have failed to provide adequate assurance that 
Pyongyang will not engage in such illicit activities.
Recommendations
To mitigate the nuclear proliferation risks posed by Russia, Pakistan, and 
North Korea, the United States and other NPT nations should work to 
tighten export controls, more effectively track Russian stockpiles, elimi-
nate nuclear networks, and expand the non-proliferation regime.
Effective Export Controls
In 2003, following revelations that Libya would abandon its nuclear 
weapons program, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials 
discovered components for nuclear weapons worth hundreds of millions 
of dollars including blueprints for a half-ton nuclear weapon in Libya. 
While it is unlikely that a terrorist organization like al-Qaida will develop 
weapons independently, small nuclear bombs could be smuggled or 
purchased on the black market for the right price. It is imperative that 
export controls be strengthened to limit the illegal proliferation of nuclear 
materials.
Devising effective export controls that allow nuclear trade for peaceful 
purposes without increasing the proliferation of nuclear arms is a chal-
lenge given the relative ease with which nuclear technologies could be 
converted for use as weaponry. Although bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements assist governments in developing and enforcing export 
controls, it is ultimately the responsibility of an individual nation to limit 
nuclear proliferation. States will not maintain effective export controls 
without the political will, incentives, and the resources to enforce them.30 
Governments must also balance export controls with international trade, 
as strict regulations could also hinder trade relationships by making the 
export process excessively onerous.
Political scientist Matthew Fuhrmann wrote in a 2007 World Affairs arti-
cle, "To be truly effective, non-proliferation export controls must be 
Diez et al.: Global Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010Journal of Strategic Security
24
implemented globally. Otherwise, a state wishing to acquire sensitive 
dual-use technologies merely has to shop around to find a supplier with 
weak or nonexistent controls."31 International agreements to curb the 
illegal trade of nuclear materials such as the NPT, the Wassenaar 
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use 
Goods and Technologies, and United Nations Resolution 1540, are only as 
effective as the export controls of Russia, Pakistan, and North Korea, the 
weakest links in the nuclear supply chain.
Policing non-compliant states remains a serious challenge. International 
cooperation is just one component in developing a comprehensive non-
proliferation export control system. Other important factors include 
licensing, border and port security and enforcement, and collaboration 
between national governments and private industry.32
Russian Stockpiles
Russian stockpiles are a major source in the nuclear supply chain, as ter-
rorist organizations are able to acquire nuclear weapons and materials 
through a network of providers in the FSU. The Wassenaar Arrangement 
requires Moscow to be transparent in the transfer of conventional arms 
and dual-use items and to use export controls as a counterterrorism tool. 
However, Russia has failed to fulfill its obligations. Moscow has generally 
prioritized domestic economic development over international security. 
Encouraging Russia to be more proactive in its counterterrorism and non-
proliferation efforts continues to be a challenge.
Tracking Russian stockpiles more closely would enhance non-
proliferation efforts worldwide. During the 2000 Clinton-Putin Summit, 
the United States and Russia agreed to share real-time information on 
missile launches and weapons-grade materials. To date, the plan has not 
been implemented. Russia has made some progress in securing nuclear 
materials by revising export legislation in 1999 and by establishing the 
Export Control Commission of the Russian Federation to coordinate 
export control lists for missiles and related dual-use technologies and 
equipment. However, Moscow has failed to effectively regulate, 
consolidate, and secure its nuclear materials.33
Nuclear material accounting is a fundamental measure needed to ensure 
compliance with international agreements. More stringent safeguards 
that include containment and surveillance are examples of ways to signif-
icantly diminish the threat posed by Russian stockpiles. Developing preci-
sion instruments for measuring sensitive materials and a more complex 
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system to track their movements are other essential steps that can be 
taken to mitigate this threat.
Illegal Nuclear Supply Networks
While it would be difficult to fully eliminate illegal nuclear supply net-
works, targeting key elements within the illicit trade would reduce terror-
ist access to nuclear materials and weapons. Nuclear forensics, cutting 
supply, monitoring tacit knowledge holders, strengthening regulations, 
and consolidating materials in Russia are methods that could be used to 
diminish illegal nuclear supply networks.
Nuclear forensics is a relatively new science wherein analysts collect 
debris from a bomb explosion or a sample of black market fissile material 
and trace it to the source by identifying "nuclear fingerprints."34 While 
this method has improved in sophistication and accuracy over the last 
several years, there are limitations to its use as a deterrent. In order to be 
effective, a deterring force must have commitment, credibility and mili-
tary and/or law enforcement authority over national governments. The 
current international non-proliferation regime's authority is limited by 
the states that support it.
Acquiring tacit knowledge, or the expertise to develop nuclear weapons, 
remains one of the greatest barriers that second-tier nations or non-state 
actors face in building a successful nuclear program. In the short term, 
these players lack the know-how to develop nuclear weapons.35 However, 
this is changing. The consolidation, regulation, and security of materials, 
as well as the restriction of tacit knowledge transfers, are vital to limiting 
nuclear proliferation. It is imperative that illegal nuclear networks are 
destroyed before they expand. International non-proliferation entities 
attacking these networks must understand their unique structure, and 
target the critical points within the structure, in order to effectively elimi-
nate them. Nuclear supply networks are becoming increasingly dangerous 
as they devise new ways to transmit knowledge and technology without 
detection.
Ultimately, the most effective way to limit second-tier proliferation is to 
strengthen regulations in Russia and consolidate materials. While nuclear 
forensics has promise, it faces challenges of credibility, capability, and 
commitment. Eliminating the supply to second-tier networks is a difficult 
task, but it could delay nuclear proliferation to high-risk nations or non-
state actors. Efforts should be made to expand the nuclear supply regime 
by offering high-risk nations greater incentives to denuclearize.
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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
International nuclear non-proliferation efforts are hindered by the refusal 
of countries such as Pakistan and North Korea to participate in the inter-
national regime. These nations continue to produce, sell, and trade WMD 
technologies without formal constraints, facilitating the emergence of sec-
ond-tier proliferation networks.36 Diplomatic strategies have been 
employed with little success, and economic sanctions have yielded mixed 
results.37
Working harder to expand the "nuclear club" to include Pakistan could 
motivate Islamabad to become a more responsible nuclear state. If Paki-
stan were to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the 
international community could assist Islamabad in maintaining domestic 
controls of nuclear and missile technology and more effectively regulate 
the nation's nuclear trade.38 Reassessing the standards required for join-
ing organizations like the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group would allow more nations to participate.39 The United States 
should also consider establishing a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). 
This agreement would require NPT nations to follow more specific arms 
control measures.40
Understanding the diverse motivations that drive nuclear countries to 
proliferate is key to limiting the spread of nuclear technologies and ulti-
mately combating the threat of nuclear terrorism. Regional security con-
cerns and economic constraints are frequently at the heart of nuclear 
proliferation. Pakistan developed nuclear weapons to compete with India. 
North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, abandoned it in 2003, and continues 
to sell ballistic missiles today because the associated revenue stream is 
integral to the country's economy.41 In this case, the Asian nation's eco-
nomic interests have trumped international pressure.42 Islamabad and 
Pyongyang have supported one another's nuclear endeavors by swapping 
Pakistani weapons materials and technologies for North Korean missiles.
There is speculation that Pakistan will continue its weapons trade with 
North Korea as Islamabad seeks missiles with greater accuracy, mobility, 
and payload.43 It is important that the international community address 
the regional nuclear imbalances of East and South Asia to decrease WMD 
trade between these two nations.44 Limiting nuclear weapons material 
production in Asia could help to mitigate the security concerns that drive 
illegal nuclear production. North Korean economic interests should be at 
the heart of the next round of Six Party Talks.
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 3  No. 1
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss1/3
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.3.1.2Global Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
27
The fight against nuclear proliferation is a challenge on all levels. While 
supply side strategies directly address the problem of proliferation, a 
renewed focus on the causes of demand for nuclear weapons would play a 
critical role in combating future proliferation. A combination of supply 
and demand side efforts would ideally influence the decision-making pro-
cesses of current and prospective nuclear states and encourage adherence 
to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.45
Conclusions
The War on Terror is the new Great Game where terrorist acquisition of 
nuclear weapons is the ultimate threat, and our military installations, 
places of work and homes are the new frontier. Nuclear non-proliferation 
is a multifaceted problem that requires innovative solutions. To meet this 
ominous new threat, the United States should lead the international com-
munity in strengthening export controls through improved cooperation, 
expanding incentives to encourage nations to fulfill their obligations 
under the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime, and policing those 
states and individuals that fail to meet their obligations.
The United States should layer supply and demand side tactics in order to 
counter the latest wave of proliferation. Continued support of export con-
trols, agreements, and the establishment of new treaties are effective 
methods to limit supply. The United States should also address demand 
by encouraging high-risk nations to participate in the international 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. These measures will likely improve the 
security of sensitive nuclear technologies and reduce the risk of terrorist 
acquisition of nuclear weapons.
According to former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, the likelihood of a single 
nuclear bomb exploding in a single city is greater today than at the height 
of the Cold War.46 From "mutually assured destruction" to modern-day 
suicide terrorism, we have entered a new era in international security. 
Nuclear terrorism poses a significant challenge to U.S.-led counterterror-
ism and counter-proliferation efforts. Only international cooperation and 
proactive measures will effectively limit the dangers of this 21st century 
threat.
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